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Land Use Regulation, the Federal
Courts, and the Abstention Doctrine
Despite frequent invitations to impose constitutional restraints on
local government regulation of private land use,' the federal judiciary
has consistently declined "to sit as a zoning board of appeals."2 Recent
decisions expanding the scope of private actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,3 however, have encouraged more frequent challenges to local
land use regulations4 in federal court.5 Given the traditional reluctance
of federal courts to decide land use cases, the enhanced attractiveness
of the federal forum calls for more careful examination of abstention
as a device for limiting federal land use litigation.
Although abstention to allow state courts to decide a case within
federal jurisdiction is normally the exception, 7 several courts have sug-
gested recently that abstention is especially appropriate in land use
cases.8 This Note argues that a federal judicial policy of abstaining from
1. For example, several recent Supreme Court cases challenged local land use regula-
tions that effectively prevented low-income persons from residing in a community. See
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
2. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
accord, Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 960 (1st Cir. 1972);
see pp. 1135-36 infra (discussing judicial reluctance to decide land use cases).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (person who, under color of state law, subjects citizen "to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws," liable to party injured); see p. 1138 infra (listing typical § 1983 land use actions).
4. This Note uses the term "land use regulations" to refer to zoning ordinances, sub-
division controls, growth-management programs, and similar legal devices adopted by
states and municipalities to control uses of private land.
5. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipality is con-
sidered a "person" for § 1983 purposes); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538
(1972) (§ 1983 supports action to protect property rights); see pp. 1136-39 infra (discussing
impact of Monell and Lynch).
6. Abstention doctrine refers to various circumstances in which a federal court may
decline to proceed although it has constitutional and statutory jurisdiction. See pp. 1140-41
inIra (outlining three branches of abstention doctrine).
7. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976);
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
8. E.g., Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838 (9th
Cir. 1979); Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D. Md. 1978); Stall-
worth v. City of Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Ala. 1976). The increasing number of
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deciding most land use disputes is necessary to promote the values of
federalism and to achieve efficient resolution of land use disputes. The
Note contends, however, that the importance of preserving a federal
forum for the protection of constitutional rights militates against a
categorical rule of abstention in land use cases. The Note therefore
proposes a general policy of abstention in land use cases; application of
the policy in particular cases, however, should depend upon three con-
siderations: whether the asserted constitutional right is fundamental
in nature, whether the state is involved in local land use regulation,
and whether the regulations single out individual landowners for un-
fair treatment.
I. Land Use Cases and the Federal Courts
Conflict between the responsibility of federal courts for enforcing
constitutional norms, and their intuitive sense that land use cases be-
long in state courts, is apparent in the federal judiciary's past treatment
of land use cases. In response to the recent increase in federal land
use litigation, courts have frequently abstained as a means of relegating
land use cases to state courts.
A. Conflicting Trends
1. Federal Reluctance to Decide Land Use Cases
Since it decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.9 in 1926,
the Supreme Court has heard few land use cases. 10 Although the Court
reentered the land use field in the 1970s," its disposition of the recent
land use cases that discuss abstention demonstrates the growing importance of this issue.
Less than 10 land use cases decided prior to 1970 discuss abstention, e.g., McLarty v.
Borough of Ramsey, 270 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1959); Lerner v. Town of Islip, 272 F. Supp.
664 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); at least 50 cases decided since 1970 discuss the issue. See Strom, Local
Zoning and the Federal Courts, I ZONING & PLAN. L. UIFP. 73, 77-78 (1978) (noting more
frequent abstentions in land use cases).
9. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning ordinance challenged as violative of equal
protection and due process guarantees).
10. The Court heard four land use cases in the two years following Euclid. Seattle
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325
(1927). Between 1930 and 1970 the Court virtually abandoned the land use field, hearing
only three cases: Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
PLANNING LAw 557-58 (1975).
II. The Court heard eight land use cases during that decade: Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 US. 104 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
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cases has tended to discourage federal land use litigation. 12 The volume
of land use litigation in the lower federal courts has increased in recent
years, but a variety of procedural 13 and substantive 4 devices, including
abstention, have been invoked to discourage land use litigants from
entering federal court.
2. Expansion of Land Use Litigants' Federal Rights
Despite this pattern of hostility toward land use claims, two recent
Supreme Court decisions have enhanced the attractiveness of the federal
forum to land use litigants. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,";
the Court eliminated the jurisdictional amount requiremelrt as a poten-
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971); see N. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 557-58 (1975) & 53 (Supp. 1978). Another land use
case is currently before the Court. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25,
157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 658 (1980).
12. With the exception of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the
Court has not awarded plaintiffs relief in any land use cases decided since 1970. The
Court's recent activity in the land use field therefore has not established any clear consti-
tutional restraints on public regulation of private land use.
Moreover, the Court has erected new obstacles to adjudication of certain land use dis-
putes in federal court. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court held that local land use restrictions precluding low-income
minority groups from residing in the community did not, absent proof of intentional
discrimination, violate the equal protection clause. Together with Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975) (nonresident challengers of town's exclusionary zoning lacked standing),
Arlington Heights has forced opponents of exclusionary zoning to concentrate their ef-
forts in state courts. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J.
481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d
669 (1979). See generally Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HAv. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1978) (discussing
Supreme Court hostility to exclusionary zoning claims).
13. For example, the standing doctrine has been invoked to bar challenges to munici-
pal land use regulations that allegedly harm nonresidents. See, e.g., Construction Indus.
Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976);
United States Gen., Inc. v. City of Joliet, 432 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1977). In addition,
the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), that the amount in con-
troversy exceed $10,000, has sometimes been a barrier to federal land use litigants. See,
e.g., Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); Eisen v. Eastman, 421
F.2d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1969).
14. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme Court
established a permissive standard for substantive due process review: "it must be said
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that [its] provisions are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395. Lower courts have invoked that standard to deny
relief to land use litigants. See, e.g., Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 48 U.S.L.W. 2593, 2594
(3d Cir. Feb. 21, 1980) ("absent defects in the process of enacting the legislation, or of
manifest irrationality in the results flowing from that process, courts will uphold state
and local land use regulations against challenges based on federal constitutional grounds");
Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895, 897 (N.D. Cal.
1971) ("courts should interfere with the judgment of the local authorities only in the
most extreme cases, and under the most extreme circumstances").
15. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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tial barrier to "takings" claims in federal courts,16 by holding that sec-
tion 1983 could be used to vindicate property rights. 17
Monell v. Department of Social Services 8 was even more significant.
In that decision, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of municipal
liability for constitutional violations. Prior to Monell, federal courts
had generally granted only injunctive or declaratory relief against un-
constitutional municipal regulations.' 9 Though damages could in
theory be recovered from municipal officials for their unconstitutional
acts, 20 immunity doctrine2' and other practical considerations22 often
barred recovery. In Monell, however, the Court held that municipali-
ties are persons for purposes of section 1983.23 The Court therefore
established for the first time that damages could be recovered directly
from a municipality for constitutional violations in suits brought under
section 1983.24
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) ($10,000 jurisdictional amount).
17. 405 U.S. at 543.
18. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Mosher v.
City of Phoenix, 287 U.S. 29 (1932); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F.
Supp. 709, 727 (D.N.J. 1976) (citing cases).
20. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
21. A number of lower federal courts have held that local legislators, like state
legislators, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), and federal legislators, United
States v.'Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), are immune from suit for their legislative acts.
See, e.g., Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (E.D. Va.
1979); Shellburne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237, 241-44 (D. Del. 1968). The
Supreme Court has not decided this issue. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 n.26 (1979). An executive official is immune from
liability so long as he acted within the scope of his legitimately defined discretionary
authority. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974); Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County
of Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1320-21 (E.D. Va. 1979).
22. A municipal official might lack the means to pay a judgment, a jury might be
reluctant to assess damages against an official who was performing his job, or the
plaintiff might not be able to establish which of several officials was responsible for the
constitutional injury. See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitu-
tional Violations, 89 HARv. L. REv. 922, 923 (1976).
23. 436 U.S. at 663; see note 3 supra (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)). Monell over-
ruled in part Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961) (municipalities are not "persons"
subject to suit under § 1983) and City of Kenosha v. Brown, 412 U.S. 507, 511-14 (1973)
(§ 1983 does not support action for injunctive relief against city).
24. The Monell Court held that the legislative history of section 1983 demonstrated
Congress' intent to impose liability on municipalities only for an unconstitutional "official
custom" or "policy." 486 U.S. at 694. The Court expressly precluded municipal liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. Given that land use regulations are gen-
erally adopted by ordinance, whether the constitutional wrong resulted from official
municipal policy will rarely be an issue in land use cases. The Court decided only that
municipalities cannot be afforded an absolute immunity, reserving the question whether
municipalities are entitled to some form of official immunity. Id. at 701. This issue
was resolved in Owen v. City of Independence, 48 U.S.L.W. 4389 (U.S. April 16, 1980),
in which the Court held that municipalities have no immunity from liability in section
1983 actions. See generally Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM.
L. REv. 213, 245-47 (1979) (reasons supporting good-faith immunity for executive officials
do not support good-faith immunity for municipalities).
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As a result of Monell, federal remedies appear to be superior to
available state relief in land use cases.2 5 A municipality may now be
liable in damages -6 under federal law for a taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment,27 a deprivation of due process28 or equal protection
rights, 29 or an abridgement of the First AmendmentA ° By contrast,
25. Prior to Monell, some lower federal courts, relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), had held that a direct cause of action for damages
based on the Fourteenth Amendment was available to challenge unconstitutional land
use regulations. See, e.g., Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260, 265-66
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709, 715-17
(D.N.J. 1976). The Supreme Court has reserved the question of the availability of a direct
cause of action based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398 (1979); 'Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1976).
26. While the extent of municipal liability under section 1983 in the land use context
remains to be defined precisely, it seems clear that Monell supports some form of damage
relief against unconstitutional regulations. In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), the Court suggested that damages might be an ap-
propriate remedy if unconstitutional regulations had been adopted by the agency. Id. at
405 n.29. Lower courts have read Monell as authorizing damage relief in land use cases.
See, e.g., Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Va. 1979);
Gipson v. Township of Bass River, 82 F.R.D. 122 (D.N.J. 1979) (dictum). Nevertheless, a
declaration of invalidity may still be sufficient relief in certain instances. See Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct.
658 (1980) (no inverse condemnation claim in zoning challenges); Note, Inverse Con-
demnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 SrXN.
L. Rav. 1439 (1974) (damages should not be awarded against municipalities when zoning
held unconstitutional).
27. Even before Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), lower
federal courts had entertained damages actions for limited types of takings-for example,
actual physical invasions of land, e.g., Lowe v. Manhattan Beach, 222 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.
1955), or abuse of municipal eminent domain powers, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 405
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968). See Note, supra note 22, at 950 n.145. Subsequent federal cases,
relying on .Bivens, awarded damages for temporary and permanent takings resulting from
unconstitutional land use regulations. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386
(6th Cir. 1978); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974). But see
Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc) (municipality
immune in Bivens-type action).
These precedents will be applicable in future section 1983 land use actions because
courts generally apply law developed in section 1983 litigation "to fill the doctrinal in-
terstices of a Bivens-type action." Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F.
Supp. 709, 717 (D.N.J. 1976); accord, Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558
F.2d 928, 942 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n of the Dist. of
Columbia, 477 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 858-62 (N.D. Il1. 1979). See generally Developments
in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 1427, 1504-28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments-Zoning] (discussing due process challenges to zoning regulations).
29. See, e.g., Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Va.
1979); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976).
30. Some localities have recently used land use regulation to control certain types of
expression. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Developments-




governmental immunity doctrine under state law generally protects
municipalities from suit to recover economic losses caused by enforce-
ment of unconstitutional regulations. 31 Moreover, most states have held
that damages are not a proper remedy when land use regulations effect
a taking.32
Because section 1983 claims may be presented in either state or
federal court,33 the prospect of broader relief under federal law need
not necessarily lead to an influx of land use cases into federal court.
Yet the commonly held beliefs that federal courts are more vigilant
protectors of federal rights than are state courts,34 and that state courts
are more open to political influence,- will probably lead most section
1983 land use litigants to bring their actions in federal court.
The conflict between the historical preference of federal courts for
leaving land use decisions to state courts, and the recent expansion of
land use litigants' substantive federal claims,3 6 requires some resolu-
31. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr.
365 (1975); Veling v. Borough of Ramsey, 94 N.J. Super. 459, 228 A.2d 873 (1967); 18 E.
MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.22c (3d ed. 1977). Although the
scope of municipal tort liability under state law has expanded in recent years, see Note,
Municipal Tort Liability: A Legislative Solution Balancing the Needs of Cities and Plain-
tiffs, 16 URs. L. ANN. 305 (1979), most states continue to recognize immunity for govern-
mental actions that are legislative or discretionary in nature, such as enactment of land
use ordinances, see E. MCQUILLIN, supra, at § 53.04a; Note, supra, at 314.
32. The majority of state courts have held that damages are not recoverable when a
challenge to land use regulations is successful. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24
Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 658 (1980);
Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 38 Colo. App. 44, 554 P.2d 317 (1976); Fifth
Ave. Corp. v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 581 P.2d 50 (1978) (en banc); cf. Fred F.
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5,
cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (no inverse condemnation action;
damages may be recoverable). Contra City of Miami v. Romer, 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954);
City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.V.2d 389 (Tex. 1978).
33. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H.
WECHSLER, HART AND WVECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTENI 431-38
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & NVECHSLER].
34. See N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, &: B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1293-94 (4th ed. 1976); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv.
1105, 1115 (1977). The Supreme Court, however, has consistently decided forum-allocation
decisions on the assumption that state and federal courts are equally effective protectors of
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 493 & n.35 (1976). That the Court's assumption is not widely accepted by
litigants is indicated by the fact that the 17,500 section 1983 actions filed in federal court
during 1976 represented a 300% increase over the number filed in 1970. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 149 (Supp. 1977). The total number of state court section
1983 actions ever decided is less than 1,000.
35. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972) (concluding that § 1983 was
enacted because state courts were being used to harass minorities); Neuborne, supra note
34, at 1127-28 (unlike life-term federal judges, state judges generally elected for fixed term
and therefore less insulated from majoritarian pressures).
36. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), decided the
same term as Monell, also will expand the volume of land use litigation in federal court.
The City of Lafayette Court held that municipalities are "persons" within the meaning
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tion. Lower federal courts have begun to experiment with abstention
doctrine as one device for accommodating the competing trends.
B. Abstention and Land Use Litigation
1. Abstention Doctrine and Federalism
Federal courts repeatedly assert a general obligation to hear con-
stitutional claims.37 That obligation, however, is subject to a variety
of prudential limitations, 38 among which are the three branches of the
abstention doctrine.39
The first branch of abstention doctrine derives from Railroad Com-
mission of Texas v. Pullman.40 Under the Pullman doctrine, a federal
court should abstain from deciding a case involving a sensitive constitu-
tional issue that might be eliminated, or at least modified, by state
court resolution of an uncertain state law question.41 A second branch
of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts and therefore can be held directly liable for
antitrust violations. Several lower courts have held that municipal land use regulations
can constitute antitrust violations. See, e.g., Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason
City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979); Nelson v. Utah County, [1978-1] TRADE CASES
(CCH) 62,128 (D. Utah 1977) (relying on court of appeals ruling in City of Lafayette).
Although 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear
federal antitrust claims, abstention is not precluded. See Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316
F.2d 820, 824-28 (9th Cir. 1963); Schenley Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirits Whole-
salers Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872, 882-83 (D.N.J. 1967).
37. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964)
(quoting Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (" 'When a federal court is
properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take
such jurisdiction.' ")); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910) (same); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (same). This "rule" is subject to numerous
qualifications. See note 38 infra; cf. Note, Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending
Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE L.J. 978, 980-81 (1950) (referring to
"supposed . . . 'absolute' right" to benefit of federal jurisdiction as "originating in in-
auspicious dicta").
38. For example, prudential considerations apply in standing doctrine, HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 33, at 150-85, political question doctrine, id. at 214-41, abstention
doctrine, id. at 985-1050, and rules governing conflicts of jurisdiction between state and
federal courts, id. at 1230-59; see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 113-27 (1962)
(discussing Supreme Court practice of withholding power of judicial review).
39. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Absten-
tion Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
40. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
41. In addition to requiring an uncertain state law question upon which a sensitive
constitutional issue depends, Pullman abstention requires an adequate state remedy be
available. Id. at 501. When Pullman abstention is ordered, the plaintiff may either sub-
mit his federal claims for state court resolution or reserve them for subsequent federal
court determination; accordingly, the federal court generally retains jurisdiction over the
case. In any event, the plaintiff is required to inform the state court of his constitutional
claims in order to permit that court to consider them in construing the state law. See
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419-21 (1964); Field,
supra note 39, at 1079.
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of the abstention doctrine, derived from Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 42 is
invoked when federal judicial action would be "disruptive of state
efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of sub-
stantial public concern." 43 Finally, abstention is appropriate under the
rule of Younger v. Harris44 when, "absent bad faith, harassment, or a
patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for
the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings" 45 or state "civil
proceedings in which important state interests are involved." 46
The three branches of the abstention doctrine rest in part on the
more general concept of federalism, the notion that "attributes of
sovereignty attaching to every state government" impose limitations on
federal power,4 7 including the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal
courts.48 The instrumental values of federal deference to state and
local decisionmaking include assuring greater public access to govern-
ment, facilitating development of policies responsive to local condi-
tions, and allowing each state to serve as a "laboratory" of social policy
for the benefit of the nation.
49
Only a limited set of federal impositions on the states is prohibited
absolutely by the federalism doctrineY0 Nevertheless, federalism is a
42. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Unlike Pullman abstention, Burford abstention is not pred-
icated on the presence of either uncertain state law or a federal constitutional issue.
Burford abstention also differs from the Pullman branch in that it results in dismissal of
the case; the plaintiff must therefore submit all of his claims to the state court, even if
they rest on federal law. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 350
(1951); see Field, supra note 39, at 1153.
43. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
44. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
45. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976).
46. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). The Younger branch of abstention doctrine
has undergone considerable evolution in recent years. Originally confined to state criminal
proceedings, Younger gradually has been expanded by the Court to include some civil
cases. See, e.g., id. at 419 (state suit seeking emergency custody to protect battered
children); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (attachment by state in proceed-
ings to recover funds fraudulently received under public assistance program); Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (civil nuisance action commenced by state "in
aid of and closely related to criminal statutes").
47. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
48. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
49. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1133,
1180 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Federalism]; cf. New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stressing importance of states as
social and economic laboratories).
50. Although National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), refuted the notion
that the Tenth Amendment is a constitutional dead letter, id. at 842-43, the exact scope
of proscribed congressional impositions on the states is uncertain. At its core, the Court's
constitutional federalism doctrine protects the existence and political accountability of
the states as independent units of government. See id. at 848 ("[Tlhe federal requirement
directly supplants the considered policy choices of the States' elected officials and ad-
ministrators as to how they wish to structure pay scales in state employment"); Coyle v.
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potent prudential consideration that courts may invoke in determining
how and when to assert their jurisdiction. 51
2. Abstention and Land Use: The Rule and Not the Exception?
Despite frequent judicial declarations that "[a]bstention from the
exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule, ' 52 recent
federal cases suggest that abstention in land use cases may in fact have
become the rule.53 Not surprisingly, reliance on abstention to avoid
adjudication of land use disputes has been most common in those states
in which innovative land use programs have spawned extensive litiga-
tion.54
The manner in which courts have manipulated traditional doctrine
in order to justify abstention illustrates the judicial predisposition to
abstain in land use cases. Some courts have relied on expansive con-
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) ("The power to locate its own seat of government and
to determine when and how it shall be changed .. . are essentially and peculiarly state
powers"); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975), remanded and
vacated on other grounds sub nomn. Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, 431 U.S.
99 (1977) ("A federal regulation which compels the states to enforce federal regulatory
programs clearly 'impairs the States' integrity' and 'their ability to function in a federal
system'.").
The Eleventh Amendment is a narrow, but strict, limitation on federal judicial power
vis-ih-vis the states. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Eleventh Amend-
ment bars award of retroactive benefits due plaintiffs under state public assistance pro-
gram).
51. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440 (1977) (federal court should inquire
into its "proper role" in litigation when there is concurrent state proceeding); Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (although § 1983 is exception to the anti-injunction
statute, federal court still restrained by "principles of equity, comity, and federalism");
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (federalism does not absolutely protect "States'
Rights" from interference, but refers to "a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments"); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (abstention is justified by "regard for
the respective competence of the state and federal court systems and for the maintenance
of harmonious federal-state relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State").
Thus, though constitutionally based, federalism-like the three types of abstention-
generally represents a discretionary, rather than an obligatory, limitation on the exercise
of federal jurisdiction.
52. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
813 (1976); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
53. See note 8 supra. But see, e.g., Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County
Council, 567 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1977) (declining to abstain); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Town-
ship of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976) (same).
54. In California, for example, the federal courts have abstained in nearly every case
since 1970 challenging the state's innovative land use regulations. See, e.g., Santa Fe Land
Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1979); Sederquist v. City
of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1978); Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach,
564 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1977). But see Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp.




structions of "uncertain state law" in applying Pullman abstention. 55
A few courts have erroneously interpreted Younger to require exhaus-
tion of state judicial remedies.5 6 Others have applied Burford to purely
local regulatory programs without questioning whether the policy
against interference with state administrative programs should apply
with equal force to municipalities.
57
The frequency of federal court abstentions in land use cases, and the
strained interpretations of traditional doctrine used to justify absten-
tion, reflect judicial discomfort with the limits of traditional doctrine
in the land use area. Abstention doctrine in the land use context could
evolve in either of two directions. First, federal courts could continue
55. Judicial manipulation of the uncertain-state-law requirement in land use cases has
assumed various forms. In Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d
1092 (9th Cir. 1976), for example, the court held that federal equal protection and sub-
stantive due process challenges presupposed that plaintiffs held a "right" bestowed by
state law-an uncertain question best resolved by the state courts. Id. at 1095. That
reasoning was dubious. Although the scope of state-defined property rights may underlie
federal procedural due process claims, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972), equal protection or substantive due process challenges to land use regulations turn
on whether the regulations are arbitrary or unreasonable, see, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc.
v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 960 (1st Cir. 1972). When a property owner chal-
lenges a regulation on due process or equal. protection grounds, therefore, no underlying
state law right is at issue.
A second type of doctrinal manipulation occurred in Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590
F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1978). In that case, the court suggested that state law was "doubtful"
because the issue of whether a municipality had abused its discretion in refusing to issue
a building permit turned "on the peculiar facts of each case." Id. at 282-83; cf. Santa Fe
Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 1979) (whether
city abused discretion by particular open-space zoning practices is question turning on
facts of each case). But Pullman abstention was inappropriate in that case. Pullman
abstention is used to avoid unnecessary interference with a valid state program by er-
roneous interpretation of an uncertain state legal issue. See p. 1140 supra. Federal and
state courts are equally capable of applying settled state law to a difficult set of facts.
Pullman abstention is not warranted in uncertain cases of this type.
Yet a third type of maneuver occurred in Newport Investments, Inc. v. City of Laguna
Beach, 564 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1977), and Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278
(9th Cir. 1978). Those courts reasoned that Pullman abstention was appropriate because
insofar as plaintiff's takings claims rested on provisions of the California Constitution that
are "mirror image[s]" of provisions in the United States Constitution, it was appropriate
to afford the state an initial opportunity to decide the case under the state provisions.
Such reasoning, however, would support Pullman abstention in all takings cases brought
in federal court. Moreover, similar reasoning has been repudiated by the Supreme Court.
See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437-39 (1971); Field, supra note 39, at 1099
n.108.
56. See Dells, Inc. v. Mundt, 400 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Resources for Human
De'., Inc. v. Furber, 387 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Salvati v. Dale, 364 F. Supp. 691
(W.D. Pa. 1973). The Supreme Court has never held that the Younger branch supports
abstention absent a pending state suit. But cf. City of Columbus v. Leonard, 99 S. Ct. 3097
(1979) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (proposing requirement of exhaustion of adequate
state judicial remedies prior to commencing § 1983 action in federal court).
57. See, e.g., Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D. Md. 1978);
Stallworth v. City of Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236, 240 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
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to rely only on traditional abstention doctrine, but could declare that
land use concerns deserve great weight in applying the conventional
branches. Alternatively, federal courts could recognize land use con-
cerns as independent bases for abstention even if traditional abstention
requirements are not fully met. The latter policy is preferable in order
to promote the values of federalism and to resolve land use disputes
efficiently.
II. The Justification for a Land Use Abstention Policy
A number of public policies justify federal abstention in land use
cases. Although some of these policies reflect traditional absfention con-
cerns, their special and collective significance in the land use context
justifies a distinct judicial policy for such cases.
A. Policy Justifications
Abstaining courts have not always made clear the bases for their
decision. Many have simply declared that land use regulation is a
"sensitive" area of state policy5s or that it is a traditionally "local"
activity.59 Such justifications are inadequate. 60 Concededly, the sen-
sitivity of state policy is a traditional reason for invoking Burford
abstention, and judicial deference to local decisionmaking furthers
federalist values. Yet the quality of sensitivity or the concept of localism
cannot provide a principled rationale for abstention in land use cases:
federal courts routinely decide local matters of the utmost sensitivity.0'
58. E.g., Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1978); Webber v.
Skoko, 432 F. Supp. 810, 813 (D. Or. 1977).
59. E.g., Hill v. City of El Paso, 437 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1971); Kent Island Joint
Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 462 (D. Md. 1978).
60. At least one case also predicted that opening the federal courts to land use cases
would add a significant number of cases to an already crowded federal docket. See Nation-
wide Amusements, Inc. v. Nattin, 325 F. Supp. 95, 98 (W.D. La.), rev'd on other grounds,
452 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1971). Avoiding court congestion is a questionable justification for
abstention. Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 443 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (congestion of federal courts an appropriate rationale) and C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL CouRTs § 52, at 227-28 (3d ed. 1976) (same) with Thermtron Prods., Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976) (suit may not "be dismissed or referred to state
courts" because federal court "considers itself too busy to try it"). Given the volume of
land use litigation, see note 63 infra, if congestion were a permissible consideration in
any class of cases, it certainly would be appropriate in the land use field.
61. If sensitivity were a sufficient justification for abstention, administration of local
school systems would be a more appropriate field for abstention than is land use regula-
tion. But federal courts clearly have not followed that reasoning. See, e.g., Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979) (ordering system-wide school desegregation); Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (same).
Some courts have used the term "local" to refer to the federalist values that would be
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Use of these terms may, however, reflect inchoate judicial concern for
the values of federalism and efficiency. In that case, "sensitivity" and
"local" might be regarded as proxies for four more-principled justifica-
tions for land use abstention: greater state court experience in deciding
land use cases, superior state court knowledge of local conditions, a
desire to avoid disruption of state land use programs, and promotion
of state experimentation in land use policy.
1. Greater Experience
Several federal courts that have abstained in land use cases have noted
that state courts possess greater experience in deciding land use cases
than do federal courts.62 The greater volume of land use litigation in
state courts63-a pattern likely to persist in spite of Lynch and Monel164 -
results in greater state court familiarity with land use problems in
general and with the state's scheme of land use regulation in particular.
As a result, state courts can resolve land use disputes in a more efficient
and consistent manner.
2. Familiarity with Local Conditions
Abstaining courts also suggest that state courts are more familiar with
local conditions than are federal courts. The smaller geographical juris-
diction of state, in contrast to federal, courts suggests that a state judge
is likely to be more familiar with the parcel of land in dispute and
advanced by abstention. See, e.g., Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455
(D. Md. 1978); Stallworth v. City of Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Ala. 1976). One
decision suggests that local land use disputes are simply trivial or routine, and for those
reasons should be avoided by the federal courts whenever possible. See Hill v. City of
El Paso, 437 F.2d 352, 356-57 (5th Cir. 1971). But under either rationale, abstention in all
local disputes would frustrate the Civil Rights Act's objective of protecting against con-
stitutional violations by local officials. See Developments-Federalism, supra note 49, at
1153-54.
62. See, e.g., Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 462 (D. Md. 1978);
Stallworth v. City of Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236, 240 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
63. As of 1969, just over 10,000 zoning cases had been decided in state courts. N.
WILLIAMS, sutra note 10, at 555. Given the increase in land use regulations, see F. BOSSEL-
MAN, D. FEURER, 8: C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION: COORDINATION OF THE PROLIFERA-
TION (1976), and the general growth in litigation, the rate of accumulation of cases has
probably increased in the 1970s. By contrast, as of January, 1980, approximately 150 land
use cases had been decided in federal courts.
64. See pp. 1136-39 supra (discussing how Lynch and Monell have expanded federal
court jurisdiction in zoning cases). Because section 1983 can be invoked only if a con-
stitutional issue is present, challenges to land use regulations based on state common law,
statutory, or constitutional grounds will generally continue to be brought in state courts.
Moreover, the great majority of land use precedents have been set by state courts; a
plaintiff may feel more confident in relying on those precedents if the case is brought in
state court. Finally, in exclusionary zoning cases, for example, a plaintiff may be more
likely to prevail under state law than under federal law. See note 12 supra.
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with its environs. 63 Just resolution of substantive due process and
takings challenges to land use regulations requires a court to consider
physical characteristics of the site, social expectations regarding per-
missible land uses in the area, and the economic viability of alternative
land uses. 66 Insofar as a state judge is usually better able to assess those
factors than is a federal judge, state court resolution of land use dis-
putes is more likely to be correct.
7
3. Avoidance of Disruption
A third justification for federal deference is that land use regulation
often involves an extensive and elaborate administrative program in
which both the state and numerous local governments participate."8
Federal court challenges to such programs frequently require decision
of uncertain state legal questions or application of settled state law to
complex, uncertain facts.69 The likely results are conflicting interpreta-
65. In California, for example, the federal district court is divided into four judicial
districts; by contrast, the state superior court-the court of general jurisdiction in Cali-
fornia-sits in each of the state's 58 counties. THE AMERICAN BENCH 170-75, 185 (M.
Reincke ed. 1979). New Jersey has only one federal district, but the state superior courts
sit in each of the state's 21 counties. See N.J. CONsT. art. 6, § 3. Florida is divided into three
federal districts, but 20 state circuit court districts. THE AMERICAN BENCH, supra, at 412,
414-16.
The requirement in many states that a judge reside in the district in which he serves,
e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 69502 (West 1976); N.J. CONsT. art. 6, § 3, is also likely to result
in state court judges having a greater familiarity with local conditions than federal judges
will have.
66. Cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (legitimacy of
zoning plan "varies with circumstances and conditions. A regulatory zoning ordinance,
which would be clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as
applied to rural communities.") For example, a minimum lot size for residential use of
four acres may be unreasonable in one community, see, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), but a minimum lot size of 43 acres may be
permissible under different conditions, see, e.g., Adirondack Park Agency v. Ton-Da-Lay
Assocs., 61 A.D.2d 107, 401 N.Y.S.2d 903, appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 834, 381 N.E.2d 612,
409 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1978). Because a state judge will be more familiar with the local
environs, he is likely to be more sensitive than a federal judge to these local factors, and
therefore more likely to apply the Euclid standards correctly.
67. Federal jurors are drawn from wider geographical areas than are state jurors.
United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150 (1965); see 28 U.S.C. § 1861
(1976) (petit juries selected from community in the judicial district or division). State
jurors, then, like state judges, are probably more sensitive to local conditions and hence
better equipped to apply Euclid standards correctly.
68. In many states, adoption of a comprehensive plan consistent with state standards
is a precondition for municipal land use regulations. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302.4
(West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.175 (1977). As of 1975, sixteen states had adopted one
or more state-level land use controls. See N. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, § 160.01, at 389.
69. See, e.g., Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 841
(9th Cir. 1979); Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092, 1095
(9th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court has held that federal courts should decide state law
questions first if doing so might avoid a constitutional issue. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). A federal court may also be required to interpret state law
in order to identify which constitutional issues are present. See Field, supra note 39, at 1111.
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tions of state land use regulations by federal and state courts,70 inter-
ference with efficient resolution of land use disputes, 71 and disruption
of state efforts to establish a coherent land use policy.7 2 The traditional
objective of both the Burford and Pullman doctrines-avoiding inter-
ference with state programs-is therefore furthered by abstention in
most land use cases.
73
4. Promotion of Experimentation
Finally, because the permissible and appropriate scope of public
regulation of private land use has not been resolved,74 land use regula-
tion is a proper subject for state experimentation free from federal
interference. A few federal courts have recognized explicitly that federal
adjudication of land use disputes would tend to create a uniform, na-
tional land use law, interfering with state initiatives in land use
policy.75 By contrast, a land use abstention policy would encourage state
innovation.
B. The Need for a Distinct Land Use Abstention Policy
The justifications for land use abstention indicate that an abstention
policy would foster important federalist values and would facilitate
efficient resolution of land use cases.7 6 Federal courts should therefore
70. See Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 71 F.R.D. 573, 576
(S.D. Cal. 1976), afl'd, 596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting state courts had not yet in-
terpreted recent California land use legislation). A federal court's construction of state
law might be erroneous in the sense that the highest state court might later contradict
that holding. The error may not be corrected until the same issue is presented to
the state supreme court in a subsequent case. See Field, supra note 39, at 1095, 1111.
71. E.g., Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092, 1095 (9th
Cir. 1976); Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 71 F.R.D. 573, 576
(S.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1979).
72. E.g., Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 493 F.2d 481, 483 (4th Cir.
1974); Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 71 F.R.D. 573, 576 (S.D.
Cal. 1976), afI'd, 596 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1979).
73. See p. 1141 supra (discussing Burford). Pullman abstention reduces the risk of
improper interference with a valid state program because the federal court might erro-
neously invalidate the state program on state law grounds. See Field, supra note 39, at
1078.
74. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONsTITUTION 8 (1977) (takings
law in state of confusion).
75. E.g., Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092, 1095
(9th Cir. 1976); Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 462 (D. Md. 1978).
76. The more efficient resolution of land use disputes that will result from con-
centration of land use cases in state courts must be weighed against the sometimes "con-
siderable delay and expense," Field, supra note 39, at 1085, caused by abstention. The
costs of abstention can be minimized if the scope of the abstention policy is clearly de-
fined, see pp. 1149-54 infra, and if a federal court dismisses the case, rather than retaining
jurisdiction after abstaining, see note 42 supra (dismissal required in Burford abstention).
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abstain in land use cases even if traditional abstention requirements
cannot be fully satisfied.
Although the policies supporting land use abstention are related to
traditional abstention concerns, the formal requirements for invoking
the three types of abstention would not be satisfied in most land use
cases. In only a minority of land use cases would Pullman abstention be
justified by the presence of an uncertain state law claim that would
modify a federal constitutional issue. Younger abstention could only
be considered in the few cases in which concurrent, state-initiated pro-
ceedings were pending.
The Burford doctrine, unlike the other two branches, embodies
many of the concerns that justify a land use abstention policy. But
Burford abstention is distinguishable from the proposed land use policy
in several respects.7 7 In Burford, the Court affirmed dismissal of a
federal suit to enjoin execution of a state administrative grant of an
oil-drilling permit.78 The Court reasoned that oil drilling involved
"basic problems of Texas policy," 79 that a complex state regulatory
scheme had been established to resolve those problems, 0 and that the
state had concentrated judicial review of administrative orders in one
set of state courts.81 In contrast to the regulatory scheme challenged in
Burford, state land use programs generally do not provide for review of
regulatory decisions by a single court or set of courts.8 2 Moreover,
whereas the proposed land use abstention policy would justify absten-
tion in some challenges to local regulations, Burford abstention has
generally been limited to state-level regulatory programs. 83
77. Only a few courts have explicitly relied on Burford to justify abstention in land
use cases. Compare Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 464 (D. Md.
1978) (invoking Burford abstention) and Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Zone Con-
servation Comm'n, 396 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 537 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1976)
(same) with Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 841-42
(9th Cir. 1979) (declining to invoke Burford) and Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of
Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 1976) (same).
78. 319 U.S. at 334.
79. Id. at 332.
80. Id. at 320-21.
81. Id. at 325-26. The Court also relied on the presence of a unified system of judicial
review in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1951),
another leading case in the Burford line.
82. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-8, 8-9 (1979) (appeal from decision of zoning or planning
board is to "the superior court for the judicial district in which such municipality is
located"); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712 (McKinney 1973) (appeal to supreme court). But see
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6089 (1979) (appeal from state environmental board is to state
supreme court).
83. Supreme Court decisions invoking Burlord have involved state, not local, regulatory
policies or activities. See, e.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951) (state public service commission); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368
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Although the Supreme Court has not discussed the possibility of a
general land use abstention policy, it did suggest in Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux8 4 that a liberal abstention rule
might be appropriate in eminent domain cases, a small set of land use
cases subsumed by the policy proposed here. In other situations, it has
permitted the expansion of abstention doctrine when adequate policy
reasons for recognizing a new branch existed.s5 The expanding volume
of federal land use litigation now justifies creation of a distinct land
use abstention category.
III. The Limits of Land Use Abstention Policy
Although abstention in land use cases would advance federalist and
efficiency values, the proposed policy would in part displace federal
courts as primary guarantors of constitutional norms. The risk of less
effective protection of constitutional rights by state courts suggests that
federal courts should abstain only in those cases in which the policy's
underlying values would be most frequently advanced, while preserving
a federal forum for those cases in which federal protection of constitu-
tional rights is most critical.
A. General Obligation to Hear Federal Claims
The "virtually unflagging obligation"86 of federal courts to decide
cases properly before them precludes a categorical rule against federal
adjudication of land use cases-particularly because most federal land
(1949) (state legislation regarding teaching of foreign languages). But cf. Allegheny County
v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) (challenge to county eminent domain proceed-
ings not barred by .Burford).
84. 360 U.S. 25 (1959). The current scope and vitality of Thibodaux abstention is un-
certain. In County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), decided the
same day as Thibodaux, the Court reversed the dismissal of a challenge to state eminent
domain proceedings, stating that eminent domain did not represent a special category in
abstention doctrine. Id. at 191-92; see Field, supra note 39, at 1148-53 (discussing Thibodaux
abstention). These conflicting authorities have led to inconsistent treatment of challenges
to eminent domain proceedings. Compare Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.
1975) (abstaining) with Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (not
abstaining). Nevertheless, Thibodaux demonstrates both the Court's sensitivity to the
special character of land use cases and the capacity of abstention doctrine to evolve to
meet new judicial concerns.
85. The three traditional branches of abstention doctrine emerged over a period of
30 years. The Younger branch in particular has been expanded greatly in recent years.
See note 46 supra. The possibility of a fourth abstention category was raised in Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976) (when tradi-
tional abstention requirements are not met, federal suit may still be dismissed "due to the
presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration").
86. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
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use cases will arise as section 1983 actions.8 7 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment and section 1983 prohibit states from depriving a citizen of his
constitutional rights.88 These constitutional and statutory mandates bar
total federal judicial abdication even in a field so narrowly defined as
land use.
B. Guidelines for A bstention
Resolution of the conflict between judicial deference to the states
and enforcement of constitutional norms requires qualification of the
general land use abstention policy proposed here. Because a court must
rule on an abstention motion prior to trial on the merits, 9 a federal
judge cannot be certain whether a constitutional violation has occurred,
although he can accurately assess the efficiency and federalism concerns
at stake. Taking that uncertainty into account, it is possible to identify
several guidelines for abstention that would promote federalist values
and efficient resolution of land use disputes, while preserving the con-
stitutional rights protected by section 1983.
1. Fundamental Versus Nonfundamental Rights
First, the abstention policy should be disregarded when a plaintiff
contends that a land use regulation infringes fundamental constitu-
tional rights. Such rights would include fundamental interests pro-
tected by the due process9° and equal protection clauses, 91 the right to
be free of discrimination as a member of a suspect group,92 and the
87. Some judges and commentators have suggested that abstention is inappropriate in
civil rights cases. E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180-81 (1959) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 230 (Winter 1948). The Court, however, has not adopted a rule
against abstention in civil rights cases. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per
curiam); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). Given the breadth of the section 1983
action after Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); see pp. 1136-37 supra,
such a rule would create an enormous exception to the abstention doctrine.
88. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see Developments-Federalism, supra note 49,
at 1167-75.
89. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (196-).
But cf. Field, supra note 39, at 1102-03, 1108-11 (proposing that federal courts prejudge
merits of abstention cases in order to identify policies that would be served by abstention).
90. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family relationships
protected from municipal interference).
91. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934
(1976) (right to travel).
92. See, e.g., Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Va.
1979) (motion to abstain denied in suit alleging racially discriminatory administration of
land use regulations).
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right of free speech.0 3 The importance of these constitutional rights, 94
and the fact that federal courts are generally more effective than state
courts in protecting them,95 outweigh the federalism and efficiency
concerns supporting abstention. In land use cases involving alleged
infringements of fundamental rights, therefore, the normal presump-
tion that abstention is the "exception, not the rule" should govern.
Although the distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental
rights would significantly restrict the scope of the proposed abstention
policy, it would still permit federal courts to direct a majority of land
use cases to the state courts: cases involving takings, rational-relation
due process, and procedural due process claims.
2. State Versus Local Policies
Second, abstention is more appropriate in cases involving state rather
than purely local land use policies.90 A lesser degree of deference toward
local policies is appropriate because local governments are not re-
strained by the plurality of interests that compete at the state level and
93. See, e.g., Tovar v. Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1979) (decision to abstain
reversed in suit claiming abridgment of First Amendment).
94. Some commentators regard the need for federal protection of fundamental rights
as requiring a per se rule against abstention when such rights are at issue. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN L.w INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS § 1371(g), at 50 (1969) (abstention not appropriate in cases involving
denial of vote or discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin); cf. Field,
supra note 39, at 1129-31 (presence of fundamental rights claims, including violations of
First Amendment and racial discrimination, weigh against abstention). Cases involving
fundamental constitutional rights, however, may also present "sensitive" constitutional
questions, see p. 1140 supra; the presence of such questions militates in favor of absten-
tion, see Field, supra note 39, at 1131 n.160.
95. Professor Neuborne argues, first, that federal courts possess greater technical legal
competence and are therefore more assertive in enforcing legal rights; second, that the
federal courts' "psychological set" makes it more likely that a constitutional claim will
succeed in federal court than in state court; and, third, that the federal courts' greater
insulation from the political process renders them more prone to counter the will of the
majority. Neuborne, supra note 34, at 1120-28; cf. N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUBORNE,
supra note 34, at 1293-94 (federal courts are primary guarantors of constitutional free-
doms); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 157,
158-59 (1953) (federal courts enforce national rights established by Supreme Court rulings
more consistently than state courts). The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly re-
affirmed that state courts are presumptively as effective as federal courts in protecting
constitutional rights. See note 34 supra (citing cases).
96. A few land use cases have recognized this distinction. Compare Rancho Palos
Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092, 1094 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1976) (abstention
warranted because California has adopted open space policy and municipalities are
required to include open space element in master plans) with Lerner v. Town of Islip,
272 F. Supp. 664, 667-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (when "there is no single source of state judicial
or administrative control," cannot be said that "redress to the federal courts by a
property owner threatens to undermine the state's land use program").
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can more easily be manipulated to further narrow, parochial interests. 7
Municipal land use decisions are likely, moreover, to be less well-
informed than state-level decisions. 9 Constitutional rights are there-
fore more likely to be violated when a municipality, rather than a state,
regulates land use.90 Relatively infrequent application of the abstention
policy in challenges to purely local land use decisions is thus necessary
to preserve access to a federal forum for individuals with legitimate
constitutional claims.
Several additional factors militate in favor of more frequent absten-
tion when state-authorized land use policies are challenged. First, al-
though federal judicial deference to either states or local governments
promotes federalist values, the Supreme Court has explicitly recog-
nized that state sovereignty deserves greater respect. 100 Second, federal
intervention would have a more disruptive effect on a statewide land
use program than it would on a purely local one.' 0 ' Finally, deference
to state land use decisions would reinforce the national policy of en-
97. For an extreme example of monopolization of local government powers, see Whit-
worth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated sub nor. City of Impact v. Whit-
worth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), opinion reinstated per curiam sub nor. Whitworth v. Perkins,
576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979) (conspiracy exists among
government officials, developer of town, and liquor retailers to incorporate "wet" town
within "dry" county and to prevent other town residents from selling alcoholic beverages
by excluding liquor establishments from noncommercial zones).
98. Municipalities generally lack the technical legal and planning assistance available
to state agencies. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 38-40 (1966); Developments-Zoning,
supra note 28, at 1591. These generalizations may not apply, however, to those urban
communities with populations over 100,000; those communities, however, constitute only
2% of all cities. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMIMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
23 (1979) (Chart No. 22). Many of these communities have as structured a land use pro-
gram as some states. See, e.g., NEw YORK CITY CHARTER & ADNM. CODE §§ 191-202 (1976 &
Supp. 1979). Courts should consider whether certain urban regulatory programs carry the
same indicia of political accountability and technical expertise as state programs and
therefore should be accorded the same degree of federal deference.
99. It is a tenet of American political thought that the risk of abuse of governmental
powers increases as the size of the political unit decreases. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No.
10 (J. Madison); cf. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 74, at 210 n.31 (local land use regulatory
authorities entitled to degree of judicial deference intermediate between that assigned to
"self-aggrandizing" bureaucracies and "the central legislative processes of the state or
nation").
100. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412
(1978) (cities not sovereign); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (counties and
cities are not "sovereign entities"; they are "subordinate governmental instrumentalities
created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions"). The
Constitution distinguishes between states and subordinate entities in a variety of ways.
For example, the Eleventh Amendment does not protect municipalities from suit in
federal court. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). The Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction extends to cases "in which a State shall be a party." U.S. CONST. art.
3, § 2, cl. 2.
101. See p. 1146-47 supra.
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couraging states to assume greater responsibility for land use regula-
tion.102
3. Systemic Versus Individual Challenges
As a third limitation on the proposed policy, abstention should be
invoked more readily in a challenge to a broad regulatory scheme than
in a claim of unlawful government action against an individual land-
owner. 0 3 Federal invalidation of a comprehensive regulatory program,
or of a decision issued pursuant to such a program, is more disruptive
of efforts to develop a coherent land use policy than is invalidation of
a particular decision directed against an individual landowner. 04
Federal court abstention in the former case clearly would advance
federalism and efficiency but would be of less importance in the latter
case. The political process, moreover, provides less protection against
unfair treatment of an individual than of numerous landowners af-
fected by a general regulation. 10 The ostensible purpose of section
102. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (1976) ("The key to more effective protection and
use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone is to encourage the states to
exercise their full authority over the land and waters in the coastal zone"); 40 U.S.C.
§ 461 (1976) (authorizing federal funds for comprehensive state planning). Most com-
mentators agree that purely local land use regulation fails to reflect the social and
economic interrelationships of the municipality, the surrounding region, and the state.
See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, supra note 98, at 145-50, 159-66; U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, THE Qui-T REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROLS 2-3 (1971); Developments-Zoning,
supra note 28, at 1590-92.
103. Cases denying, as well as granting, abstention motions have relied on this distinc-
tion. Compare Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603, 607
n.12 (4th Cir. 1977) ("Rather than a broadside attack on an entire statutory scheme, this
suit alleges merely an isolated abuse of state power.") and Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic
Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803, 808 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same) with Kent Island Joint Venture
v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 464 (D. Md. 1978) ("Unlike the present case, Donahoe [sic] did
not concern the reasonableness of a land use classification made pursuant to a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme.") and Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 539 F.2d 592
(6th Cir. 1976) (same).
Although the dividing line between these two classes of cases will be difficult to draw,
most cases will be readily identifiable as belonging to one class or the other. For example,
it is clear that a court should abstain when a landowner attacks a general zoning classifica-
tion, see, e.g., Stallworth v. City of Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Ala. 1976), but
should not abstain from deciding whether a municipality downzoned (i.e., reduced the
permitted density of development) a particular parcel in order to reduce its cost to the
municipality in later eminent domain proceedings, see, e.g., Donohoe Constr. Co. v.
Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1977).
104. Professor Field argues that Pullman abstention should not distinguish between
challenges to broad regulatory programs and challenges to an official's authorization for
particular conduct. Field, supra note 39, at 1123-25. Although Field is correct that federal
interference in either case will limit the scope of permissible government activities, id.,
the interference is likely to be less extensive when a particular official act is challenged
because the conduct at issue is less likely to be repeated.
105. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); B. ACKERMAN,
supra note 74, at 52 (court should be especially vigilant in reviewing governmental
decisions imposing burden of collective enterprise on small set of property owners).
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1983 was to prevent state officials from singling out individuals for
abuse, not to authorize federal judicial supervision of state regulatory
programs.10 6
Conclusion
The abstention doctrine is an appropriate judicial device for direct-
ing the majority of land use litigants into state courts. A land use
abstention policy would further important federalist values and would
facilitate efficient resolution of land use disputes. But the importance
of fundamental constitutional rights, and the greater vigilance of
federal courts in protecting those rights, should preclude abstention
when infringement of such rights is asserted. Moreover, courts should
carefully weigh the competing values at stake in deciding whether or
not to abstain when the challenge is to purely local regulations, or when
the claim is that regulatory authorities have singled out an individual
for unfair treatment.
106. See Developments-Federalism, supra note 49, at 1153-54 (Civil Rights Act of 1871
enacted principally to remedy complicity of state and local officials in terrorism against
black leaders and Union sympathizers).
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